It is completely clear that Socrates had one explicit, fundamental goal throughout the entire dialogue, and that was to grasp the full understanding of the meaning of piety. Moreover, because Socrates was set to stand trial for the offense of impiety, the opposite of piety, he sought to acquire a completely sound understanding of the meaning of piety, and use it as his defense against the prosecution (Meletus) in the court: “I was hoping that you would instruct me in the nature of piety and impiety; and then I might have cleared myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about to lead a better life” (Euthyphro, Plato)…his plan was crafty, to say the least. Socrates represented a type of person that we might generally call agnostic. His counterpart, Euthyphro, represented not only what we would call a faithful believer, but he represented someone that was considered to be adept or well-versed regarding matters of the Gods and morality, and ultimately a man of integrity. Knowing this, Socrates figured he would simply take advantage of the opportunity to become aware of the nature of piety from a rather renowned and credible source, readily available to him. Thus, he proceeded to do just that, allowing “piety” to live between the both of them, prominently, for what seemed like an intense moment of time.
This very mentally stimulating dialogue consists of Euthyphro attempting to define piety for Socrates. However, it is interesting to note that none of Euthyphro’s responses to Socrates’ “What is piety?” was sufficient enough, as Socrates was able to offer logically valid arguments that clearly refuted them all. Initially, Euthyphro asserted that “Piety is doing as I am doing…” (Plato) referring to his act of prosecuting his own father for murder. Socrates skillfully refuted Euthyphro’s assertion by reminding him of the nature of the question and simply making him aware of his neglect to provide a precise answer to the question. Euthyphro’s second attempt at defining the term for Socrates was to provide the difference between piety and impiety: “Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them” (Plato). Socrates is relatively pleased with this answer, but yet swiftly finds an angle to successfully challenge the notion. Socrates was able to show how certain acts, particularly, Euthyphro’s prosecution of his father, could be deemed as simultaneously pious and impious, by revealing how the act would generate enmity among the gods—and also, once again, making Euthyphro aware of his neglect to precisely answer the question. As a final definition for piety put forth by Euthyphro to include here, it should be noted that in acknowledging “justice” as merely a “more extended notion of which piety is only a part” (Plato), Socrates requests that his counterpart “tell [him] what part of justice is piety or holiness, that [he might] be able to tell Meletus not to do [him] injustice, or indict [him] for impiety, as [he is] now adequately instructed by [Euthyphro] in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites” (Plato). Euthyphro kindly responded, this time in much more of a timid manner saying that “Piety or holiness, […], appears to [him] to be that part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to men” (Plato). Again, Socrates is dissatisfied, expressing his desire and need for more information on the subject. This extremely intricate dialogue goes on a little further, only to end with the famous Socrates still separated from the ultimate truth that he sought.
To provide a scholarly definition to the word piety, according to dictionary.reference.com, it would have to be noted as “reverence for God or devout fulfillment of religious obligations” (2013). Although the website did provided three other definitive variations, when considering the nature of the subject presented here, as well as in Plato’s Euthyphro, this particular definition is the one most relevant—and if I must speak from my personal perspective, I would have to say that the website’s definition is sufficient for me. This definition is the one also, I believe, would have been appropriate in the dialogue between Euthyphro and Socrates. The reason for this belief is simply because it is not clear to me how anyone, including Socrates (although it is very difficult to assert this statement here without feeling a sense of timidity) could find an angle to challenge it and successfully refute the notion. The website’s definition, as I understand it, provides a direct, head-on description of what piety is, which is exactly what Socrates was seeking from Euthyphro in their dialogue.
People took religious very seriously back in the day of Socrates, even to the extent of it being sort of the next best thing to a governing body’s law. It seems safe to say that, in a sense, people were almost expected to carry out certain aspects of religion regardless of their personal opinion. Euthyphro, according to Plato’s literary illustration, was the human definition of piety, yet could not intellectually define what it essentially was. Additionally, Socrates, exercising his great ability to intellectually mine for ultimate truth, did exactly that, continuously validly making Euthyphro aware of his inability to actually define the term. However, it should be duly noted that regardless of how Socrates exceedingly exhausted the subject using his reasoning, men have yet, collectively agreed that there is a precise and formal definition for the term and it has been established. Furthermore, with great respect to Socrates and his reasoning, the famous philosopher was only one man, and as everyone knows…majority rules, and Socrates’ reasoning, in regards to piety’s meaning, has not been established as being valid enough to reject the terms dictionary definition. Thus, the term can simply be defined as we have defined it to be.
References
Plato (427?
BCE-347? BCE), Euthyphro trans., Jowett, Benjamin,
retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1642, June 9, 2013
Dictionary.reference.com
(2013)
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