In addition, the author elaborately presented an acute explanation of the principle, magnifying the possible effects, if the principle were appropriately applied. According to Singer, if acted upon, “even in its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally changed” (Singer, 1972). For example, in applying the principle one would not consider typical factors such as proximity and distance. Refusing to consider such factors make a person more likely to help someone physically closer, but not unwilling to offer assistance to someone across the globe, eliminating the possibility of justifying discrimination on the grounds of geography (Singer, 1972). He continued, highlighting a more pessimistic perspective that measured one’s humane responsibility or duty. Using an illustration of seeing a child drowning in a pond, Singer questioned the level of responsibility one really has to save that child, when also noticing others that are “no further away” (Singer, 1972) and are very much aware of the situation, yet still having neglected to assist the child. He concluded this assessment by asserting the point that the perspective which considers an excess of people available to help as a means to lessen the obligation, responsibility, or duty of the primary individual is, in fact, “absurd”, labeling it as “an ideal excuse for inactivity” (Singer, 1972).
In the article, Peter Singer also presented his concept of marginal utility, in which he predominantly equated the concept with his overall position on the subject. It is clear that the author’s overall position is that of the aforementioned principle. However, it is understood that his ultimate position on the subject is built on this fundamental idea: to “prevent bad things from happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, [would] require reducing ourselves to the level of marginal utility” (Singer, 1972). He particularly defines marginal utility to be almost a menial level of existence that occurs as a result of one giving to relieve others in need. It is presented in the article (via excerpt authored by Thomas Aquinas) that, as a person possessing an excess of resources, you are, in a sense, indebted to the person living in poverty. Thus, establishing the offering of the portion of resources one does not need, as one’s duty.
Transitionally, while providing a thorough account of his primary position, the author expanded on the subject, shining a little light on its yang perspective. Singer argued that the change of society’s moral mentality or “moral conceptual scheme”, expressed in his position, is “too drastic” of a change. He explained that because people normally do not consider living luxuriously and not donating to the poor, as morally incorrect as they would consider the immoral act of killing someone, altering society’s mentality in regards to his position would be a bit too much to implement. Another counter-argument the author made, addressed whether “giving away a great deal of money” is the most effective way to “prevent (something bad from happening) starvation” (Singer, 1972). The author did explicitly assert his opinion that donating privately would not be enough, and that constructing new ways to contribute finances publicly as well as privately would be necessary. Interestingly, another way Singer challenged his position was by presenting the idea of rising population rates, and the earth’s ability to support the multitudes. He introduced the possible problem, if appropriately considered, that this would present for individuals in favor of “preventing (something bad from happening) famine” (Singer, 1972). This argument was surprisingly concluded with the ironic yet unique strategy of supporting organizations that concentrate on population control, rather than contributing to conventional methods of “preventing (something bad from happening) famine” (Singer, 1972).
In considering Peter Singer’s take on society’s moral mentality, it must be noted that his perspective on the subject was nothing less than radical then, just as it would be now. In regards to one of his counter-arguments, he was completely on target with the assumption that because of the way society actually perceives morality, the difficulty of implementing his particular paradigm would be at an enormous level. Aside from that, Singer’s primary position is, undoubtedly, provocative, in that, essentially, there should be no nation, community, family, or individual that should have to suffer from anything—especially something as mediocre as famine—simply because an equation of unconditional love, peace and harmony generates enough resources to support everyone on the planet. Additionally, no one particular nation, community, family, or individual should feel obligated to fork out any of their personal resources to assist in any matter that is not their own, however, all of these entities, when necessary, should feel obligated to empathize and imagine themselves in the needy situation, causing a willingness to develop a practical and meaningful strategy to assist and contribute effectively. Furthermore, the subject of moral responsibility is one that, most certainly, should not be disregarded, and is also a subject that should not generate a great deal of conflict. Regardless of race, color, or creed, we are all a member of an intelligent human family that should always consider the hardships of others, and be enthusiastically willing to assist anyone in need when we are able—and that’s morality!
References
Famine, Affluence, and Morality,
Peter Singer, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1972),
pp. 229-243 Published by: Wiley, Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052
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